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Optional
Forest
Yeld Taxes

Statelegislators
are asking,needtimbergo untaxeduntilharvest?.
By Gary D. Kronrad and Clifford A. Hickman

lthough
thetaxreform
billnow
beforeCongress
couldmean

higher incometaxes and lower
profits for tin•Joerland
owners,ad va-

lorempropertytaxes can still be re&iced by enrollmentin specialforest
propertytax programsofferedby some
states. Ad valorem taxes on forestland
have been a concern for more than a

peatedlytaxed year after year until final harvest. A long cashdrain discouragesintensiveforestmanagementand
promotespremature cutting (Kleml•
erer 1980).

Under the yield tax, enactedby a
number of states, land is taxed annu-

ally,but timbergoesuntaxeduntil harvest.A grossincometax equalto a percentury.Criticsfelt that anannuallevy
centage of stumpage value is then
on fair market value of both land and
imposed.Stateswith forest-yieldtaxes
timber encouraged
forestexploitation. find that the programs have advanFairchild(1935)referredto the problem
tages and disadvantages(see box on
as a "deferred-yieldbias."The annual
page30).
timbergrowth(income)is accumulated
MarquissurveyedU.S. yield taxesin
1952 and found low enrollments. Over
on the stump until final harvest, and
eachyear'sincrementof incomeis rethe years,the Timber Tax Journal has

followed the trends, as have Williams
(1957)and Hickman (1982). In a recent

studyof optional-yield
taxes,we looked
at key legislativeprovisions,
the effect
of eachtax on averageannualproperty
taxes, use of the programs,and problems encountered in administering
them.

State

foresters
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Gary D. Kronradis assistantprofessorof forest
resourceeconomics,
Small WoodlotForestry Researchand DevelopmentProgram,Schoolof Forest Resources,
NC State University,Raleigh.Clifford A. Hickmanis principaleconomist,USDA
Forest Service,SouthernForest Experiment Station, New Orleans,LA. Researchwas supported
by the USDA ForestService,SouthernForestExperimentStation.

JULY 1986 27

neliqible property owner. in growing
umbers complain that more of the annual

)ropery-tax burden is shiftedto them.
resident experts on their yield-tax
laws,andthe expertswere interviewed
by telephone.
Legislative Provisions

Nine states currently have 11 optional yield tax laws. Not included in
this total are 4 repealedstatutesapplicable only to properties already enrolled. These are Louisiana's

1910 Re-

forestation Contract Severance Tax,
Minnesota's1927Auxiliary Forest Tax,
New

York's

1926 Fisher

Forest

Tax

Law, and Washington'sReforestation
Act of 1931. Idaho and Michigan currently havetwo statuteseach.Connecticut's 1913law is the oldest, and Idaho's

1983legislation,the most recent.
Six states (CA, LA, MS, NH, OR,
and WA) impose mandatory yield
taxes, under which all forest landowners pay a yield tax at harvest.
States with mandatory laws were not
surveyed.
Optional yield taxes have been
adoptedfor a variety of reasons,but
improvedtimbermanagementhasbeen
a primary considerationin all states.
Other motives include tax relief for for-

est owners, reforestationof cutover or
burned areas, forest preservation,and
economicstability. Purposesless frequently cited were conservation,tax
equity, administrative efficiency, and
multiple-useforestry.

Alabamais the onlystatenot limiting
enrollment.

Other

states restrict

ad-

stipulatethat landownersagreeto keep
their land in timber productionfor a
specifiednumber of years. Contracts
extend from 5 years in Alabama to 50
years under Idaho'sfirst law. In New
York, a hybridapplicationprocedureis
employed.Participants must commit
their land to timber productionfor 10
years,recertify this commitmentannually,andpaya $25applicationfee. Similar feesare alsocollectedby Massachusetts and under Idaho's first law.

Though all optionalprogramsdefer
timber taxes until harvest, tax rates

vary. In Connecticut,timber morethan
10 years old and cut from tracts enrolledfor 10 yearsor lessis taxed at 2
percentof estimatedvalue. At the oppositeextreme, Idaho'sfirst law mandatesa 12.5percentrate. In additionto
tax deferment,manystatutesstipulate
that certain timber productscanbe cut
withoutincurringa tax obligation.The
most frequent exemption applies to
trees cut by landownersfor domestic
use.Other exemptionsapplyto timber
used in harvesting operationsor removedin noncommercial
cuttings.
The tax treatment

basethe land tax on a fixed, reduced,or
use-valueassessment.In two cases,a

fixedper acretax is mandated.The hybrid proceduresemployedin Alabama
and Connecticut

differ from the norm.

Alabama'slaw exemptstracts of 160
acresor lessandappliesa fixed assessment to all other properties. Connecticut'slaw employsa fixed assessmentin
combination with a 10-mill tax-rate ceil-

ing.
Six statesrequirelandownersto have
a formal managementplan, and three
stipulatethat publicaccessbe allowed.
To minimize the impact of tax deferment and modified assessment on local

government revenues, participants
must pay a penalty uponeither voluntary or involuntary withdrawal from
the program. In addition,three states
partially offsetrevenuelossesby making annual paymentsto local governments based on enrolled acreage. In
Wisconsin, the payments are $0.20/
acre/year,in Missouri$0.50/acre/year,
and under Michigan'sfirst law, $0.70/
acre/year.Other objectivesare prompt
restockingand controlof grazing.

of land differs sub-

stantially amongstates. In Hawaii, no
enrolled land is taxed. Elsewhere, an
annual modified property tax is imposed.The mostcommonpracticeis to

Status Quo

Tax savingspossibleunder optional
yield programsare shownin table 1.
Paymentfigures for the without-yield

Table 1. Ad valorem tax savings obtained by timberland owners participatIng in optional yield tax programs, 1983.

missions. The most common limitation

Legislation

(8 states,9 statutes)is a minimum acre-

age. This requirement varies from 1
acreunder Michigan'ssecondlaw to 50

State

Enacted

acres in New York. Other common re-

quirementsare minimumstockinglevels, maximumper acre valuesfor land
or timber, and maximum acreages.
Less frequent restrictionslimit enrollment to land requiring reforestation,
land with a minimumproductivecapability, or land for whichforestry is the
highestandbest use.
Three states require initial applications only, two require them periodically,and one requiresthem annually.
As a conditionof enrollment, 4 states
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Amended

Ad valoremtaxes
Without
yield tax

................. yr. .........................................
Alabama
tracts
tracts

1923

With
yield tax*

Savings

$/ac./yr. ........................

1945

< 160 ac.
> 160 ac.

1.00
1.00

0.00
1.00

1.00
.00

10.00
.00

.01
.00

9.99
.00

.05
.45

1.45
8.55

Connecticut
Hawaii

1913
1963

1973
1983

Idaho (1)
Idaho (2)

1929
1983

1974
1984

Massachusetts

1914

1981

Michigan(1)
Michigan(2)

1925
1917

1980
1977

3.75
3.75

Missouri
New York
Wisconsin

1946
1974
1927

1981
1979
1975

.80
8.00
3.50

1.50
9.00
22.50

øExcludesaverageannualequivalentcost of yieldtax payments

1.12

.30
.07
.16
2.00
.74

21.38

3.45
3.68
.64
8.00
2.78

'enaltes and nterest charge. w,Juldhelp
.nsure tha* •nrolle, do no
th pr,r
rn
a
dodg

higher. The acreage enrolled varies

Deficienciesin enablingstatuteshave
beenonesourceof difficulty.Somelaws
fail to requirea managementplan, and
others admit properties too small to
form economic
managementunits. Hostility on the part of local tax officials
has hinderedsomeprograms,and inadequatestaffing troubles public ad-

from 0 in Hawaii to over 2 million acres

ministrators.

1950s,continuetoday (table2). Participation varies from no landownersin

tax casereflectthe averageannualtax
imposedon land and timber combined,
andpaymentfiguresfor the with-yield
tax casereflect land taxes only. Estimatesare thus overstatementsof likely
savings and ought to be interpreted
cautiously.In decidingwhether or not
to enrollin a yield-taxprogram,forest
ownersmay not be concernedwith fu-

Hawaii to 3,200 in Wisconsin. In no

state have over 6.5 percentof eligible
landownerselected to take advantage

of an optionalyield tax. Participation
rates per eligibleacre are somewhat

ture timber tax obligations--especially under Michigan'sfirst law. In Wiscon•f they are several years away from
sin, ownershaveenrolled26 percentof
makinga harvest.
the state'squalifyingforestacreage.
Overallusageremainsstable.In MasWithoutthe optionalyieldtax, forest
sachusetts,participationis increasing
ownersin Hawaii pay the lowestaverage annual tax while their counterby approximately7 percent per year,
and Michigan'sfirst law is showinga 5
parts in Massachusetts
pay the highest. Values range from nothing to
percentincreaseper year.Missourireports a declineof 4-5 percentannually.
$22.50/acre/year.With the optional
In New York,participationis risingat
yield tax, forest ownersin Hawaii conan unknownrate, and in Wisconsin, at
tinue to pay the smallestamountannually. Along with ownersof 160 acresor
approximately 10 percent per year.
Reasons
for lowparticipationare many,
less in Alabama, they pay nothing.
and differ somewhatamongstates(see
Their acreageis exempt.At the oppoboxonpage30).
site extreme,ownersin New Yorkpay
The most common difficulty--cited
an averageannualland tax of $2 per
acre. Financial incentives to enroll are

for Connecticut,Idaho'sfirst law, Mich-

greatest in Massachusetts and Con-

igan'stwo laws, and New York--is the
inability to ensurethat yield-taxrevenues are consistentlycollected.Some
states reported that public benefits,
such as improvedmanagementpracticesandgreater publicaccess,are not
being realized;local recordsare inadequately maintained; and withdrawal
penaltiesare not consistently
imposed.

necticut and under Idaho's second law.

In contrast,no financial incentive to enroll

exists

in Hawaii

or for

tracts

greater than 160 acres in Alabama. In
both states, the annual taxes with or

without the yield-tax program are
roughlythe same.
Low enrollments,prevalent in the

Landowners

Timberland

State

Eligible* Enrolled

Ratio

Alabama

202,000

I

0.0005

Connecticut
Hawaii

20,000
30

179
0

Idaho(1)

41,000

50

Idaho(2)

25,000

....

Massachusetts

41,100

Eligible*

In Michiganand New York, somelocalgovernments
are experiencingrevenue shortfalls becauseof special tax
treatment

extended

to forest owners.

Shortfallsmake it difficult to provide
traditional services. Ineligible property owners,in growingnumbers,complainthat more of the annualproperty
tax burden is shifted to them.

These

complaints,
particularly•f accompanied
by the generalperceptionthat existing
specialforest taxes are not providing
intendedpublicbenefits,may lead to
pressuresfor programrepeal.
Proper Design

Optionalyield taxes cannotbe effe•
tire unless forest owners elect to use

them. Enrollment figures, at first
glance, would indicate that the programshavefailed. The exceptionsare
Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
and Wisconsin,where programsfunction with somedegreeof success.The
experienceof thesestatessupportsthe
positionthat optionalyieldtaxescanbe
effective•f properlydesigned.How can
optional yield-tax programs be improved?The attributes of successful
programsandcommentsofthe resident
experts suggest the following mea-

Enrolled

Ratio

sures:

20.3

2.0

0.01

plementedonlyin thosestatesin which

.90
.00

1.4
1.0

29.8
0

2.17
.00

forest landowners

.12

3.0

130.0

4.33

3.0

....

--An optionalyield tax shouldbe im-

Michigan(1)
Michigan(2)
Missouri
New York
Wisconsin

**
........
**
100,000
50,000

2,000

4.87

500

....

1,010
285
3,200

**
.28
6.40

'Ftgumsrepresentbest estimatesin mostcase&
*No data available.

2,2

8.0
5.5
5.0

146.8

6.56

2,003,0
.8

**
**

310.1
102.7
1,300.0

3.88
1.87
26.00

need some form of

tax relief to profitablyengagein forest
management. The tax should be
adopted over other alternatives only
when shownto be the most efficient,
-equitable, and politically acceptable
method of relief.

--Except for collectionof taxes due,
an optionalyieldtax shouldbe administered by the agencymost knowledgeable about forestry, usually the state
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/ostilityon the part of local tax officials
hindered some programs.

forestry agency.Taxes shouldbe collectedby localtax collectors.
--Yield- and annualproperty-tax obligations shouldbe structured so that
the averageforest owner does not receive an excesssubsidy.After adjustme6ts for differencesin risk, participantsshouldearn their alternativerate
of return and no more.

--Landownerswho haverecently cut
timber should not be allowed to enroll

in an optionalyield-taxprogramunless
they are willing to pay a tax basedon
the volume of timber removed. Without

this provision, landowners might be
temptedto cut all merchantabletimber
beforeapplication.
--State revenue-sharingshouldbe instituted to ensurethat local taxing jurisdictions do not suffer severe short-

falls becauseof the yield-tax program.
Sinceoptionalyield taxes are designed
to provide public benefits, their costs
canfairly be borneby all taxpayers.

--Landownersshouldpay an application fee at enrollment.

Fees should at

least partially coverthe administrative
costsof classifyinga property.
--An optional yield-tax law should
containa gooddefinitionof eligibleforestland. Definitions

--Optionalyield-taxprograms,once
enacted,needto be widely publicized.
Prospective participants need to be
made aware of the program's
existence.

ß

should be struc-

tured to accomplishthe objectives of
the law. For example,if the legislative
purposeis to increasetimber production in the state, only commercialforestlandshouldbe eligible.A vaguedeftnition of eligibleforestlandcan lead to
inequitiesand inefficiencies.
--Landownersshouldbe requiredto
submitinitial and periodicallyupdated
managementplans. This requirement
will help ensurethat enrolledproperties are managedto accomplish
the program objectives.
--When a property is removedfrom
an optionalyield-tax program, except
by means of an eminent domain proceeding,the landownershouldpay a
penalty.Penaltiesand interestcharges
wouldhelp ensurethat errolleesdo not
use the program as a tax dodgeor in
land speculation.
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Why Don't More Land-

Are Forest Yield Taxes a

owners Enroll?

Good Option?

Residenttax expertslistedthe
followingdeterrentsto yield-tax

programs,whichhaven'tchanged

--Administrationis easyand
inexpensive.
--Cash-flowproblemsare minimized,enablinglongerrotations.
--Risks of fire, blight,insects,and
pricefluctuations
are sharedby all

much since the fifties:

--Absence of an obvious tax ad-

vantage.
--Lack of awareness of relevant

tax options.
--Reluctanceto relinquishcontrol
overmanagementdecisions.
--Unwillingnessto allowfree
publicaccess.

landowners in a state.

•sadvantages:
--Local revenuesare lesspredict-

--Reluctance to restrict future
land-use alternatives.

able.

-Red tape of applicationproce-

--Incentives to restock cutover

dures.

lands are reduced.

--Restrictiveeligibilitycriteria,
--Severedeclassification
penal-

--A biasis createdagainstbetter
sitesandfast-growingspecies.

•es.
Photos of the Wisconsin State Senate

•. 27) and Assembly(above)are courtesy
of G. D. Konrad.
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--Poorprogramadministration.

